This paper estimates a two-country model with a global bank, using US and Euro Area (EA) data, and Bayesian methods. The estimated model matches key US and EA business cycle statistics. Empirically, a model version with a bank capital requirement outperforms a structure without such a constraint. A loan loss originating in one country triggers a global output reduction. Banking shocks matter more for EA macro variables than for US real activity. Banking shocks account for about 2%-5% of the unconditional variance of US GDP and for 3%-14% of the variance of EA GDP. During the Great Recession (2007-09), banking shocks accounted for about 15% of the fall in US and EA GDP, and for more than a third of the fall in EA investment and employment.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis began in US financial markets in 2007 and was quickly and strongly transmitted to Europe and other parts of the world. The crisis revealed the fragility of major financial institutions, and led to the worst global recession since the Great Depression. These dramatic events require a rethinking of the role of financial intermediaries for real activity. Before the financial crisis, standard applied macro models abstracted from financial intermediaries (e.g., Christiano et al. (2005) ). The crisis revealed the stark limitations of those models.
The crisis has stimulated much research that incorporates banks into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the global nature of the banking industry, and of the financial crisis, that research has frequently focused on open economy models; see, for example, Devereux and Sutherland (2011) , Kamber and Thoenissen (2011) , Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011) , Perri and Quadrini (2011) and van Wincoop (2011) . Closed economy DSGE models with banks were, i.a., presented by Aikman and Paustian (2006) , Van den Heuvel (2008) , Gerali et al. (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010) . 1 In this new class of DSGE models, bank capital is a key state variable for the supply of credit, and for real activity; negative shocks to bank capital are predicted to increase the spread between banks' lending and deposit rates, and to trigger a fall in bank credit and output; with a globalized banking system, a loan loss in one country can thus lead to a worldwide recession.
So far, this new macro-banking literature has mainly used calibrated models-a systematic empirical evaluation, using econometric methods, is necessary, to guide further model building and policy. In order to provide an empirical assessment of the role of banks as a source of shocks and as a transmission channel in the global economy, the paper here estimates (using Bayesian methods) a two-country DSGE model with a global bank. Quarterly US and Euro Area (EA) macro data and banking data (bank loans, bank 1 Other open economy models with banks can be found in Correa et al. (2010) , Davis (2010) , Nguyen (2011) , Andreasen et al. (2010) , Ueda (2011) , Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Lipinsky (2012) ; for closed economy DSGE models, see also Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010), de Walque et al. (2010) , Gertler and Karadi (2011) , Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) , Iacoviello (2010 ), Del Negro et al. (2011 , Benes and Kumhof (2011) , Dewachter and Wouters (2012) , He and Krishnamurthy (2012) , and .
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The model estimates suggest that banking shocks contributed noticeably to the 'Great Recession' of 2007-09, but were not its dominant cause: banking shocks accounted for about 15% of the fall in US and EA GDP during the recession--but they explained more than a third of the fall in EA investment and employment. During the previous two US recessions in the estimation period (1990-91 and 2001) , banking shocks accounted for a roughly similar share of the fall in US output, investment and employment as in the 2007-09 recession.
I consider several empirical measures of credit and lending spreads and find that the key results are robust across the different measures.
This paper is complementary to Gerali et al. (2010) who estimated (using Euro Area data) a closed economy New Keynesian macro model with a banking sector that faces a bank capital requirement. The paper here differs (inter alia) from Gerali et al. by estimating a real (flex-price) two-country world with a global bank that experiences loan loss shocks. By contrast, the empirical analysis of Gerali et al. focuses on the role of shocks to borrowers' collateral constraints.
Sect. 2 presents the model. Sect. 3 discusses the econometric approach. Sect. 4
describes key data features. Sect. 5 reports the estimation results. Sect. 6 concludes.
A two-country world with a global financial intermediary
As mentioned above, this paper takes the theoretical two-country model of Kollmann et al. (2011) to US and EA data. 3 In each of the two countries, called 'Home' (H) and 'Foreign' (F), there is a representative worker, an entrepreneur and a government. A global bank collects deposits from workers, and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. The bank faces a capital requirement: a fraction of bank assets has to be financed using the bank's own funds (equity). Entrepreneurs produce a homogenous tradable good that is used for consumption and for capital accumulation. All agents are infinitely-lived. Markets are competitive. Preferences and technologies have the same 6 structure in both countries. The following exposition focuses thus on the Home country.
Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
Preferences, technologies, markets
The Home worker
The Home worker provides labor to the Home entrepreneur and invests her savings in one-period bank deposits. Her date t budget constraint is:  is an exogenous random variable that will be referred to as the Home labor supply shock. Note that deposits provide utility to the worker (liquidity services). This ensures that, in equilibrium, the deposit rate is smaller than the loan rate, and that workers hold deposits while entrepreneurs borrow. The worker's subjective discount factor is decreasing in her future consumption: 11 ( ), The subjective discount factors of other agents are likewise decreasing functions of their own consumption (this induces mean-reversion in individual wealth, and thus ensures stationarity, as required for the numerical solution and estimation methods.) Agents treat their subjective discount factors as given, i.e. they do not internalize the effect of consumption on the discount factor-I thus write the argument of the subjective discount factor with an upper-bar. It is assumed that all agents have the same steady state rate of time preference, and the same risk aversion coefficient, .

The Home worker maximizes her life-time utility subject to the period-by-budget constraint (1). That decision problem has these first-order conditions:
The Home entrepreneur 
where t L is a one-period bank loan received by the Home entrepreneur in period t-1.
L t R
is the gross interest rate on that loan, set at t-1. In period t, the Home entrepreneur defaults by an exogenous random amount Freixas and Rochet (2008) ). This issue is not modeled here. Instead, I take the capital requirement as given, and focus on its macroeconomic effects.
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4 Thus, the interbank market is not modeled here. Frictions in that market would matter for aggregate activity if they affected the flow of funds from savers to borrowers. The model here captures empirical fluctuations in the loan spread and in the volume of intermediation. To investigate the potential role of an interbank market, I studied a model variant with a global savings bank and a global investment bank. The savings bank gets deposits from households, and lends to the investment bank (interbank market), which lends to firms. Each bank faces a capital requirement. Aggregate dynamics hinges on total bank capital--thus that set-up is observationally equivalent to the representative-bank model. 5 See Meh and Moran (2010) for a closed economy DSGE model in which bank capital mitigates an agency problem between banks and their creditors. The model here could be used to evaluate macro-prudential government policies that set t  as a function of the state of the economy--this is beyond the scope of the paper. Mendicino and Punzi (2011) and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) show that macro-prudential policy may have important effects on real activity and welfare.
I assume that the bank can hold less capital than the required level, but that this is costly. Let 
where * tt   is the bank's total loan loss, and
TT  is the total tax paid by the bank (in the two countries).
B t
d is the dividend generated by the bank at t. As the bank acts competitively, loan rates and deposit rates are equated across countries. (7) 
Forcing variables
Steady state TFP and investment efficiency are normalized to unity Gerali et al. (2010) assume a constant target bank capital ratio, but postulate exogenous changes in bank markups (market power) that likewise impact the spread; see also Kannan et al. (2012) . 8 The bank operating cost and cost of excess bank capital represent inputs used by the bank and have thus to be subtracted from entrepreneurs' output when computing GDP. I assume the bank purchases the resources (2007)).
Following the empirical DSGE literature, I consider a baseline specification in which all 11 forcing variables are independent univariate AR(1) processes:
for variable ,  is a normally distributed white noise.
Model solution
A linear approximation (around the deterministic steady state) is used to solve the model.
The solution can be expressed as 
Econometric approach
The model is estimated using quarterly time series for 12 macro and banking variables, in 1990q1-2010q3: US and EA GDP, total private consumption, investment, employment, commercial bank credit (deflated using the GDP deflator); the loan rate spread of US commercial banks, and the capital ratio of US commercial banks. US (EA) data are taken  (sensitivity of the loan rate spread to changes in the bank capital ratio) is crucial for the transmission of banking shocks to real activity.
The means and standard deviations of the prior distributions of these parameters are shown in Columns (1)- (2) 
Calibrated parameters
I calibrate the remaining structural parameters so that the steady state matches long run properties of the data. It would be difficult to estimate the calibrated parameters through the lens of the model, using the (detrended) empirical time series used for estimation (see Smets and Wouters (2007) ). One period in the model represents one quarter in calendar time. As is standard in the macro literature, the (quarterly) depreciation rate of physical 14 capital is set at δ=0.025. The elasticity of output with respect to capital is set at α=0.3, consistent with long run average historical US and EA labor shares of about 70%.
The two-country model here abstracts from US and EA trade with third countries; I thus use the sum of US government consumption and of US net exports to countries other than the EA as an empirical measure of US 'autonomous' spending, was no visible increase in commercial bank leverage, prior to the crisis; the authors argue that 'excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets' (p.1). It has been argued that the stability of the observed capital ratio during the crisis may partly reflect accounting discretion, which has allowed banks to overstate the value of their assets in the crisis (Huizinga and Laeven (2009) Overall, the data are thus consistent with the model's key prediction that the spread is inversely related to the bank capital ratio (see (8)). The absence of a pronounced inverse relation during the crisis might be due to the fact that the measured bank capital ratio overstates the true capital ratio during the crisis (see discussion above), or that the required bank capital ratio rose during the crisis (this could rationalize the observed increase in the loan rate spread, during the crisis, without a fall in the bank capital ratio).
The last Column of Table 2 reports moments of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered quarterly macro and banking variables, for the US and the EA (1990q1-2010q3). (The smoothing parameter is set at 1600.) The standard deviation of GDP is very similar in the US (1.12%) and the EA (1.14%). Consumption is less volatile than GDP, while investment is markedly more volatile than GDP. US investment is almost twice as volatile as EA investment. In both 'countries', loans are more volatile than output and procyclical, while the loan spread is countercyclical. Real activity and loans are positively correlated across the US and EA. (Table 1) Cols. (4)-(5) of Table 1 
Estimation results

Posterior parameter estimates
Business cycle moments implied by posterior parameter estimates (Table 2)
Cols. (1)- (9) of Table 2 Notice also that banking shocks induce a strong negative correlation between the loan rate spread and GDP.
Variance shares accounted for by banking shocks (Table 3)
Panel (a) of Table 3 reports the % shares of the predicted variances of HP filtered endogenous variables (with measurement error) that are accounted for by the 8 nonbanking shocks (see rows labeled 'NonBk'), and by the 3 banking shocks (rows labeled 'Bank'), respectively; the remainder represents the contribution of measurement error to the predicted variance.
According to the baseline model, the banking shocks account for a 3.1% share of US GDP variance, but explain larger shares of the variances of US investment: 6.1%; for EA real activity is due to the fact that (calibrated) steady state loans/GDP and deposits/GDP ratios are higher in the EA than in the US.
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Note also that banking shocks also account for 59.7% of the variance of the bank capital ratio, and for 84.7% of the variance of the loan rate spread (the bank capital ratio is mainly driven by US and EA loan losses, while the loan rate spread is mostly driven by shocks to the required bank capital ratio).
14 Table 3 shows furthermore that loan loss shocks are more important drivers of real activity than shocks to the required bank capital ratio; the latter explain merely 0.5% A robustness analysis below confirms the findings discussed in this Section. 
Impulse responses (Table 4)
Impulse responses (reported in Table 4 ) help to understand the model's mechanics, and the predicted business cycle moments. Each impulse response focuses on an isolated 12 I randomly picked 10,000 of the parameter vectors generated by the Metropolis algorithm, and computed variance decompositions for each parameter draw; for more than 97.4% of the draws, the three joint banking shocks--and US and EA loan losses individually--explain greater shares of the variances of EA GDP, investment and employment than of the corresponding US variables. 13 A given deposit rate change, due to a banking shock, has a greater effect on the EA worker's consumption and hours worked, than on the US worker's decisions; thus, EA output and investment respond more. 14 Non-banking shocks explain negligible shares of the variances of the bank capital ratio and the loan spread. Thus, a sizable share of the bank capital ratio variance (40.1%) is accounted for by measurement error. 15 Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) use closed economy models with collateral-constrained firms (no banks) to estimate shocks to firms' funding, and argue that those shocks explain up to half of US GDP variance. In the model here, only the bank faces a capital requirement. The estimates here suggest a more important role for banking shocks than illustrative calibrations in Kollmann et al. (2011) , according to which banking shocks account for less than 0.2% of the variance of real activity. This greater role is due to the fact that the estimated sensitivity of the loan spread to bank capital here, and the estimated variance of loan losses, are larger than in those calibrations.
innovation, assuming that all other exogenous innovations are zero. (To save space, Table   4 does not show responses to EA 'non-banking' shocks-those responses are qualitatively similar to the responses to US 'non-banking' shocks.)
A positive innovation to Home TFP raises Home GDP and investment, but leads to a fall in Foreign GDP. The shock raises the income of the Home worker; thus that worker saves more, and her holdings of bank deposits increase--i.e. the bank's debt rises, which lowers the bank capital ratio. The deposit rate falls (due to the greater supply of deposits), and so does the loan rate-however, the loan rate spread rises. The Foreign worker responds to the fall in the deposit rate by consuming more, and working less, and hence Foreign GDP falls. (Foreign investment rises slightly, due to the fall in the loan rate.) Country-specific labor supply shocks likewise drive Home and Foreign GDP in opposite directions.
By contrast, global banking is a powerful international transmission channel for financial shocks. Loan losses and shocks to the required bank capital ratio induce sizable common responses of Home and Foreign real activity (and loans). For example, a loan
loss in one country lowers the global bank's capital ratio, which triggers a rise in the loan rate spread-the deposit rate falls, while the loan rate rises. In response to this, loans, investment and GDP fall in both countries. A rise in the required capital ratio () t  likewise raises the loan rate spread; on impact, this too lowers loans, investment and real activity in both countries. Note also that banking shocks drive the loan spread and output in opposite directions. According to the baseline model, an unanticipated US loan loss worth 1% of steady state quarterly US GDP reduces the bank capital ratio by 14.9 basis points, on impact, and it lowers US and EA quarterly GDP by, respectively, 0.10% and 0.12%, on impact. An unanticipated EA loan loss of the same size lowers US and EA GDP by 0.14% and 0.18%, respectively. Thus, EA GDP is more sensitive to domestic and foreign loss shock than US GDP. A US loan loss lowers EA GDP more than US
GDP. An unanticipated increase in the required bank capital ratio by one percentage point lowers US and EA GDP by 0.10% and 0.11%, respectively, on impact. Columns (6)- (7) of Table 1 (1995), Kollmann (1996) ). Columns (10)- (11) of Table 2 report the implied business cycle moments. Table 2 shows that the baseline banking model (with '' 0   and banking shocks)
generates business cycles moments that are mostly closer to the empirical moments than the moments predicted by the variant without the operative bank capital requirement (and no banking shocks); see Columns (1) and (10) 
Robustness checks
The key findings about the role of the bank capital requirement and of banking shocks continue to hold in model variants with correlated shocks, and they are also robust to using alternative measures of banking variables.
The working paper version of this paper (Kollmann (2012b) Table 3 reports variance decompositions, for the correlated-shocks model variant. In that variant, the banking shocks account for slightly higher variance shares of real activity than in the baseline 18 The LMLs reported here were computed using a Laplace approximation. Geweke's (1999) harmonic mean estimator, based on parameter draws from the Metropolis algorithm, yields very similar LMLs. 19 That variant also assumes that loan losses and the required capital ratio are partly endogenous, as these variables are modeled as linear functions of GDP, and of exogenous disturbances that are independent of the non-banking shocks. The variance shares explained by banking shocks discussed below pertain to the exogenous disturbances. The (partial) endogeneity of loan losses and of the required capital ratio does not affect the key estimation results (the estimated feedback to GDP is weak).
model, namely for 5.5% (14.2%) of the variance of US (EA) GDP, and 10.6% (53%) of the variance of US (EA) investment.
Panel (c) of Table 3 reports variance shares for a variant of the banking model (independent shocks), in which the required bank capital ratio is constant, , t   so that loan losses are the only banking shocks. In that variant too, banking shocks explain somewhat greater shares of the variance of real activity than in the baseline model.
As a further robustness check, I re-estimated the baseline model using other empirical measures of the loan rate spread and of bank loans. Panel (d) of Table 3 Table 3 show that the business lending measure yields smaller variance shares due to banking shocks than the baseline total bank credit measure, while the US lending capacity measure yields roughly similar variance shares as the baseline measure.
21 Table 3 suggests that banking shocks account for about 2%-5% of the unconditional variance of GDP and for 3%-14% of the variance of EA GDP. The variance shares of employment and (especially) of investment accounted for by banking shocks are higher; in most specifications, these shocks explain more than 20% of the variance of EA investment.
Conclusion
This paper has estimated a two-country model with a global banking system, using US and Euro Area (EA) data (1990q1-2010q3), and Bayesian methods. The estimated model matches key US and EA business cycle statistics. Empirically, a model version with an operative bank capital requirement outperforms a structure without such a constraint.
Banking shocks account for a non-negligible share of the unconditional variance of real activity. EA real activity depends more on banking shocks than US real activity. US loan losses account for a greater share of the variance of EA real activity than of the variance of US real activity. During the Great Recession (2007-09), banking shocks explained for about 15% of the fall in US and EA GDP, and more than a third of the fall in EA investment and employment.
21 I also estimated the model using alternative measures of the US bank capital ratio, namely the ratios of Tier 1 capital, and of Tier 1+2 capital, to risk-weighted bank assets (Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013)). The key estimation results are robust to using those measures.
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DATA APPENDIX
A.1 Baseline data set used for estimation • US GDP, private consumption (total), investment (all at constant prices): from US National Income and Product Accounts (Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA); the investment series include private and government investment.
• US employment: 'Total nonfarm payrolls: all employees' (Bureau of Labor Statistics)
• US bank loans: outstanding 'total bank credit' by Commercial Bank, deflated using GDP deflator (from June 2011 Flow of Funds, Table L109 ).
• US bank capital ratio: (total financial assets-total liabilities)/(total financial assets) for Commercial Banks (from June 2011 Flow of Funds, Table L109 ).
• US loan rate spread: 'Commercial and industrial loan rates spread over intended federal funds rate' ('All loans' series, Survey of Terms of Business Lending, Table E .2, Federal Reserve Board, June 2011).
• EA GDP, private consumption (total), investment (all at constant prices): from ECB Area-Wide Model (AWM) database (10 th update, September 2010).
• EA employment: from AWM database.
• EA bank loans: MFI loans to private sector (from ECB monthly bulletin), deflated using the GDP deflator.
A.2 Other variables (used for estimation of model variants)
• Excess bond premium: spread between the yield on US commercial bonds and the yield on Treasury bonds, minus expected bond default probabilities, as constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2011a) using data for a panel of individual bonds.
• 'Net percentage of banks increasing spreads of loan rates over cost of funds': percentage of banks increasing spreads minus the percentage of banks lowering spreads, from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, SLOOS (Federal Reserve Board). SLOOS reports a series (net percentages of banks raising spreads) for loans to 'large and middle-market firms' and one for loans to 'small firms'. The two series are very similar (correlation: 0.95). I use the average of the two series.
• US business loans: outstanding commercial bank loans to the non-financial business sector, constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2011b) .
• EA business loans: MFI loans to non-financial corporations(NFC), from ECB monthly bulletin, deflated using the GDP deflator.
• US business lending capacity: outstanding commercial bank loans plus unused commercial bank lending commitments (credit lines) to the non-financial business sector, constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2011b) .
A.3 Other variables (used for model calibration)
• 'Autonomous spending' (G): government purchases plus net exports to third countries (deflated using GDP deflator). Data sources: AWM, BEA and ECB monthly bulletin.
• Investment efficiency: measured as ratio of CPI to Gross Investment Deflator (BEA and AWM).
All series are quarterly and seasonally adjusted (when relevant) (1) and (2) Cols. (6)- (7): model variant without operative bank capital requirement ( '' 0)   , no banking shocks.
Entries '---' in Cols. (6)- (7) represent parameters that are set at zero.
Posterior distributions were obtained using the Random Walk Metropolis algorithm (250,000 draws of which the first 50,000 were discarded).  required bank capital ratio.
The estimation uses quarterly time series on 12 time series: US and EA GDP, consumption, investment, employment and real loans; the US commercial bank lending rate spread and the US commercial bank capital ratio. The loan spread and the capital ratio are demeaned; other empirical variables are linearly detrended in log form. See Figure 1 for data plots and Data Appendix for definitions of variables and data sources. Sample period: 1990q1-2010q3 (83 periods). Note: This Table reports 
Fig. 3. US bank capital, US loan spreads and US excess bond premium
Note: In both panels, the solid line shows the demeaned US bank capital ratio. The left panel also plots the demeaned baseline US loan spread (dashed line) and the demeaned net percentage of US banks increasing spread, from Survey of Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey (dotted line). (The SLOOS series is scaled so that its standard deviation equals that of the baseline loan spread.) The right panel plots the demeaned US excess commercial bond premium of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2011a (dashed line) . Sample period: 1990q1-2010q3. Shaded areas: US recessions (NBER dates).
Fig. 4. US commercial banks: total loans, business loans and business lending capacity
Note: The solid line shows total US bank credit (baseline measure); dashed line: business lending; dashed-dotted line: US business lending capacity (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011b) . All series are linearly detrended in log form. Sample period: 1990q1-2010q3. Shaded areas: US recessions (NBER dates). 
